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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20030354-SC

SUN SURETY INSURANCE COMPANY,
and DELFINO FERNANDEZ CADENA,
Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals; therefore, this
Conn lus, jurisdiction

•

•* u ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the court of appeals lack jurisdiction to decide an appeal taken by a nonparty from a i ion-appealable order?
2. Assuming that the court of appeals had jurisdiction to decide •

inpe.-il did it

nevertheless err by refusing to follow this Court's prior holdings that an agent's
knowledge is ii i: lpi ited to il: lis pi it icipal?
On certiorari, this Court will "'review the court of appeals' decision for
correctness."' State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 12, 482 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (quoting State
v.//a/we/i, 2002 UT 125^25, 63 PJd 650).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following statute whose text
is reproduced in Addendum B:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-20b-101 to 104 (Supp. 2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After defendant failed to appear, the trial court initiated forfeiture proceedings
resulting in a judgment forfeiting his appearance bond. R. 16, 23-24. The surety on the
bond, Sun Surety Insurance Company ("Sun Surety"), moved to set aside the forfeiture
order. R. 44-51. The trial court denied the motion. R. 68-69. Sun Surety appealed from
the order denying its motion to set aside the forfeiture order. R. 74. The defendant did
not appeal his conviction. See Record, generally. The court of appeals reversed. State v.
Sun Surety Ins. Co., 2003 UT App. 55, f 6 (unpublished) (a copy of the case is attached
as Addendum A). This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sun Surety is an insurance company located in South Dakota. R. 11-12. Scott
Candland is Sun Surety's agent, doing business as Bail Out Fast located in Salt Lake
City. Id. Sun Surety, through Candland, issued an appearance bail bond for defendant.
Id. Candland executed the bond and provided the required power of attorney. Id.
When defendant failed to appear for his 16 January 2001 arraignment, the trial
court commenced bail forfeiture proceedings. R. 14-17. Notice of defendant's
nonappearance was mailed to Candland's place of business in Salt Lake City. R. 53.
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When neither Sun Surety nor Candland produced defendant within the required six
months, the tnal court entered a judgment forfeiting the bond on 26 July 2001. R. 23-24.
Defei ldantwasar^* *

-.

f

v to a charge »!

attempted failure to stop at the command of a police officer on 21 August 2001. R. 3443.
On 4 September 2001 Si n I Sui et) n io\ eci to set aside tl le jiidgn lei it on tl le sole
ground that the bail forfeiture statute required notice of defendant's nonappearance to be
mailed to Sun Surety rather than to Candland. R. 44-51. The trial court disagreed and
denied, tl le n lotioi i fit idii lg that ,4sei < • ice :»! i tl le agei it is effect! i • e as serv ice on. the surety
itself." R. 68-69 (a copy of the trial court's order is included as Addendum C), The
order denying Sun Surety's motion to set aside the forfeiture was entered 9 October 2001.
Id. ()i i 15 Octc •!: >ei 2001 line liul i mill »niieiiiai defemlanl

R 70

Sun Surety timely appealed from the order denying its motion to set aside the
forfeiture order. R. 74. The defendant did not appeal his conviction. See Record,
general 1> I I: le ::c i n I: of appeals 1 leai d tl le appeal and rev ersed the trial court's order
denying Sun Surety's motion to set aside. Sun Surety, 2003 UT \pp, 55, at ^ 6, Add. A.
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T
I (I I ill il II

k n l bond smvt\ is not .i \w\"\\ to J ruin tnal t ase, Fherefore, a surety

cannot bring an independent, direct appeal of a bond forfeiture order. Rather, a surety
must either bring its appeal in conjunction with the defendant's appeal of his conviction,
or it 'iiitisi petition for .in cxthtottlnui •, w i il Because tl le defendant did not appeal his

3

conviction, Sun Surety's direct appeal was improper and the court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction to decide it.
Point II. Even if the court of appeals had jurisdiction to decide this appeal, it
erred by refusing to follow this Court's holdings that an agent's knowledge is imputed to
his principal. This Court has repeatedly upheld this fundamental agency law principle.
In this case, Candland—the agent—received notice of defendant's failure to appear.
Therefore, the court of appeals erred in refusing to impute Candland's knowledge to his
principal, Sun Surety.
The bail forfeiture statute does not modify fundamental agency law. Nothing in
the statute indicates that the legislature intended to do so. On the contrary, the
legislature's use of the term "surety" throughout the statute indicates that the legislature
recognized and intended to incorporate fundamental agency law into the statute.
Consequently, the court of appeals erred by refusing to interpret the bail forfeiture statute
in harmony with this Court's precedents and fundamental agency law.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION TO
DECIDE THIS CASE
Utah courts have consistently held that a bail bond surety cannot bring an
independent, direct appeal from a bond forfeiture order. See Heninger v. Ninth Circuit
Court, 739 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1987) (citing People v. Tremayne, 3 P. 85 (1884));
Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Fifth District Court, 933 P.2d 1011,1012-13 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). "[A] bond forfeiture order is reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, but

4

standing alone, the order is not appealable." Heninger, 739 P.2d at 1109. "Bail forfeiture
is not directly appealable where, as here, there is no appeal of the criminal convictions."
Beehive Bail B< mt is, 933 P.2< 1; it 1012 13 (< :ttii lg Heninger, 739 r - d a: > * ••* i
When a criminal defendant does not appeal his conviction, a surety seeking review
of a bond forfeiture order must petition for an extraordinary writ. See Beehive Bail
Bonds, I nc \, 933 P 2c 11 t/i 1012 13; Heningi 7 , 739 P 2d ; it 1109. For example, in
Heninger, the bail bondsman brought a petition for extraordinary relief in district

nil,

challenging the circuit court's bond forfeiture order. 739 P.2d at 1109. The defendant
circuit court argi I id that a petitioi ifori*extraordinary relief was not the proper avenue for
reviewing the forfeiture order. Id. Rather, it argued that the bondsman hould ha\ o
sought a "direct appeal of the forfeiture ruling . . . . " Id. This Court disagreed, holding
tl lat a boi id forfeit Lire ordei , "standing alone

is not appealable," Id, Because the

defendants in Heninger did not appeal their convictions, the bondsman pi operl} pin sued
the only available remedy: a petition for an extraordinary writ. Id.
Neither Heninger nor Beehive Bail Bonds explicitly explain why a surety cannot
bring an independent, direct appeal fron i a boi i, :! foi feit i ire ordei

I he I loldings app< ?ai ,

however, to be based upon the principle that a non-party may not bring an independent,
direct appeal. See Heninger,

. n 09; Society of Professional Journalists v.

Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987); KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 i'

* M J , DI /

(Utah 1983).
For example, in KUTV, a criminal trial court entered an order enjoining the media
from referring to a defendant as the "Sugarhouse rapist" or "•" ' P<^! • :
5

' ;

defendant's prior criminal activity. 668 P.2d at 515. KUTV petitioned this Court for a
writ of prohibition directing the trial court to vacate its order. Id. at 516. This Court
recognized that the non-party members of the news media had correctly pursued the only
available avenue for obtaining appellate review of the trial court's order. See id. at 517.
"Other than the requested writ, there [was] no other remedy" available to the non-party
members of the media adversely affected by the criminal trial court's order. Id.
Likewise, in Society of Professional Journalists, the Society sought public access
to the competency proceedings in Ronald Lafferty's criminal trial. 743 P.2d at 1168.
The trial court denied the Society's motion. Id. The Society then sought an
extraordinary writ reversing the trial court's order denying public access. Id. In granting
the writ this Court reconfirmed that a non-party can only obtain appellate review of a trial
court's actions through a petition for extraordinary relief. Id. at 1172. "The very reason
for seeking appellate review by way of a writ is because the petitioner was not a party
below and cannot appeal." Id. (citing KUTV, 668 P.2d at 517).
Like the members of the media in the above cases, a bail bond surety is not a party
to the criminal case. See State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, f 30, 24 P.3d 936 (noting that
the only parties to a criminal case are the State and the defendant). As a non-party, a
surety cannot obtain independent, direct review of a bond forfeiture order. See Beehive
Bail Bonds, Inc., 933 P.2d at 1012-13; Heninger, 739 P.2d at 1109. Rather, a surety must
join its appeal with the defendant's appeal of his conviction, or it must petition for an
extraordinary writ. Id.
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In this case, defendant did not appeal his conviction. See Record, generally.
Nevertheless, Sun Surety brought this appeal directly from the order denying its motion
to set aside the forfeiture order. R. 74. Therefore, this independent, direct appeal by a
non-party was improper. See Heninger, 739 P.2d at 1109; KUTV, 668 P.2d at 517.
Because this appeal was improperly taken, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction
to decide the case. "Where an appeal is not properly taken, [an appellate] court lacks
jurisdiction and .. . must dismiss." Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ^ 8, 5 P.3d 649
(citing A J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991)).
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the court of appeals' decision and direct it to
dismiss the case. See id.
The State's earlier failure to challenge the court of appeals' jurisdiction does not
prevent its current challenge. See Housing Authority v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11, 44
P.3d 724. "[(Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
because such issues determine whether a court has authority to address the merits of a
particular issue." Id. (citing Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49, f 13, 26 P.3d 217). When
considering a jurisdictional claim, this Court does not consider whether the claim was
sufficiently preserved. See id. Therefore, this court may properly consider the State's
current jurisdictional challenge.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION CONFLICTS WITH
THIS COURT'S CONSISTENT HOLDINGS THAT AN AGENT'S
KNOWLEDGE IS IMPUTED TO HIS PRINCIPAL
Even if the court of appeals had jurisdiction, this Court should nevertheless
reverse because the court of appeals' opinion conflicts with this Court's precedent. The
7

court of appeals refused to follow this Court's holdings that an agent's knowledge is
imputed to his principal.
This Court has consistently recognized the "well-established principle" of agency
law that "'the knowledge of [an] agent concerning the business which he is transacting
for his principal is to be imputed to his principal.'" See, e.g., Wardley Better Homes and
Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99,fflf16-17, 19, 61 P.3d 1009 (quoting First Nat 7 Bank v.
Foote, 42 P. 205, 207 (1895) (alteration in original)); Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc.,
2001 UT 43, f 21, 24 P.3d 984. As this Court recognized in Wardley, "[t]his rule is
broad, encompassing 'all notice or knowledge relating to the subject-matter of the agency
which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as such agent and within the scope of his
authority.'" 2002 UT 99 at f 16 (quoting Latses v. Nick Floorf Inc., 104 P.2d 619, 623
(Utah 1940) (emphasis in original) (additional quotations omitted)).
The court of appeals' opinion conflicts with Wardley, and this Court's previous
holdings on this issue, because it holds that an agent's knowledge is not imputed to his
principal. See Sun Surety, 2003 UT App. 55 at ^ | 5-6. Sun Surety's only challenge to
the sufficiency of the notice was that it was mailed to its agent's Salt Lake City address,
rather than to its own South Dakota address. R. 48-49. It was undisputed that Sun
Surety's in-state agent, Candland, received notice of the defendant's nonappearance. See
Sun Surety, 2003 UT App. 55 atffl[2, 5-6; R. 48-49, 53. Nevertheless, the court of
appeals refused to follow this Court's prior decisions and impute Candland's knowledge
to Sun Surety. See Sun Surety, 2003 UT App. 55 atfflf5-6.

8

Common agency law principles apply even though this case involves
interpretation of a statute. "The common law . . . so far as it was not repugnant to, or in
conflict with . . . the constitution or laws of [Utah] .. . shall be the rule of decision in all
courts of this state." UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1 (2000). The legislature is presumed to
be aware of the common law which existed before the enactment of a statute, and "absent
an indication that the legislature intends a statute to supplant common law, the courts
should not give it that effect." Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction §
50.01 at 422 (4th ed. 1984).
There is nothing in the language of the bail forfeiture statute to indicate that the
legislature intended to supplant fundamental agency law. Although the statute designates
"the surety" as the proper recipient for notice, it neither states nor implies that an agent's
knowledge cannot be imputed to his principal. See § 77-20b-101 to 104 (Supp. 2003).
Moreover, the legislature's reference to the "surety" in other portions of the statute
indicates an intent to include both the agent bondsman and the principal surety company
within the meaning of the term. For example, the statute consistently refers to the person
who is to bring a fugitive defendant before the court as the "surety." See, e.g., § 77-20b101(4)(c)(i) (stating that a bond should be exonerated if "the surety has delivered the
defendant to the county jail booking facility . .."); § 77-20b-103(l) ("If a surety is unable
to bring a defendant to the court. .."); § 77-20b-104(1) ("If a surety fails to bring the
defendant before the court..."). It is most often the in-state agent who would bring a
fugitive defendant before the court, rather than the surety, who is often an out-of-state
corporation, as in this case. Therefore, the statute recognizes and incorporates the
9

fundamental principle of agency law that an agent's acts and knowledge are attributable
to his principal. See Wardley, 2002 UT 99 atfflf16-17. Consequently, the notice
provisions of the statute should be interpreted in harmony with fundamental agency law.
Interpreting a bail forfeiture statute essentially identical to Utah's, the Washington
Court of Appeals agreed that absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary, the statute
did not alter fundamental agency law. See State v. Parada, 877 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1994). The Washington statute stated that "[i]f the surety is not notified by the
court in writing of the unexplained failure of the defendant to appear . .. then the
forfeiture shall be null and void." Id. at 235. Finding that the statute did not purport to
alter fundamental agency principles, the court held that "[n]otice through an agent is
sufficient to achieve the obvious purpose of the statute: to alert the surety that it needs to
appear and defend its interests under the bond." Id. Utah's substantially identical statute
should be similarly interpreted.
In Wardley, this Court granted certiorari review and reversed the court of appeals
because its opinion "overlooked . . . the well-established principle" of agency law that an
agent's knowledge is imputed to his principal 2002 UT 99 at ^ff 16-17. In Sun Surety,
the court of appeals has again failed to recognize this fundamental principle. See Sun
Surety, 2003 UT App. 55 at ff 5-6. The court of appeals' opinion in Wardley would have
"dramatically alter[ed] agency law as it now exists." Id. at <J| 20. As it now stands, the
court of appeals' opinion in Sun Surety has that same potential and should therefore be
reversed.

10

CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate or reverse the court of appeals' opinion.

Respectfully submitted this / >

day of October 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on IC

October 2003,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two

accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER to:
David M. Cook
452 East 3900 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107-1806
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

.' State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Sun Surety Insurance Company and Delfino Fernandez Cadena,
Defendants and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20010906-CA

F I L E D
(February 27, 2003)
1 2003 UT App 55"]

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable William Barrett
Attorneys: David M. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
David E. Yocom and Trina A. Higgins, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:

Appellant Sun Surety Insurance Company ("Sun") appeals the
district court's denial of its Motion for Order to Set Aside
Default Judgment and to Exonerate Bond.
Sun challenges the district court's interpretation of the notice
requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. § 77-20b-101 (2000)
that allowed notice to the bail bondsman listed on the bond
rather than to the surety. A district court's interpretation of
a statute presents a question of law that we review for
correctness. See Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103,114, 57 P. 3d
1079. Sun further challenges the district courtfs refusal to set
aside the default judgment and exonerate the bond. "fA motion or
action to modify a final judgment' . . . will be reversed only
upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Gillmqj: v._ Wright,
850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993) (quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah
Tel^Ass/n, 557 p.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982)).
Sun argues that the plain language of section 77-20b-101
requires notice to Sun, rather than to an apparent agent. We
agree. Section 77-20b-101(1)(a) requires the court, upon
issuance of a bench warrant, to "mail notice of
nonappearance . . . [to] the surety who posted the bond." Id.
Further, section 77-20b-101(3) provides "[i]f notice of
nonappearance is not mailed to a surety . . . the surety is
relieved of further obligation under the bond if the surety's
current name and address are on the bail bond in the court's
file." Id.
"'When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning
by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give
effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.'"
Furthermore, "in construing a statute, [we] must assume that
'each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory
words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable.1"
Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112,1119, 61
P.3d 1053 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
The plain language of section 77-20b-101 requires notice to the
surety whose name and address appear on the bail bond. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-20b-101(1), (3). Although both Sun's name and
address and that of the bail bondsman appeared on the bond, it
is clear from the face of the bond that Sun was the surety for
the bond. Thus, section 77-20b-101 required notice to Sun, as
surety, at its address rather than to the bondsman at his
address. Further, without such notice, Sun "is relieved of

further obligation under the bond." Id. § 77-20b-101 (3) .
Thus, we conclude the trial court erred in interpreting section
77-20b-101 to allow notice to the bail bondsman and not the
surety listed on the face of the bond. We further conclude the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the
default judgment against Sun and exonerate the bond. See Lund v.
Brown, 2000 UT 75,19, 11 P.3d 277 ("A decision premised on
flawed legal conclusions . . . constitutes an abuse of
discretion."). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial
of Sun's motion and remand for proceedings consistent with this
decision.

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge

ADDENDUM B

Utah Code Ann.
77-20B-101. ENTRY OF NONAPPEARANCE - NOTICE TO SURETY RELEASE OF SURETY ON FAILURE OF TIMELY NOTICE.
(1) If a defendant who has posted bail fails to appear before the appropriate court
when required and the court issues a bench warrant or directs that the surety be given
notice of the nonappearance, the clerk of the court shall:
(a) mail notice of nonappearance by certified mail, return receipt requested, within 30
days to the address of the surety who posted the bond;
(b) notify the surety of the name, address, telephone number, and fax number of the
prosecutor;
(c) deliver a copy of the notice sent under Subsection (l)(a) to the prosecutor's office
at the same time notice is sent under Subsection (l)(a); and
(d) ensure that the name, address, and telephone number of the surety is stated on the
bench warrant.
(2) The prosecutor may mail notice of nonappearance by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the address of the surety within 37 days after the date of the defendant's
failure to appear.
(3) If notice of nonappearance is not mailed to a surety, other than the defendant, in
accordance with Subsection (1) or (2), the surety is relieved of further obligation under
the bond if the surety's current name and address are on the bail bond in the court's file.
(4) (a) A bond ordered forfeited by the court may not be reinstated without the
mutual agreement of the surety and the court.
(b) If the defendant is arrested and booked into a county jail booking facility pursuant
to a warrant for failure to appear on the original charges, the surety may file a motion
with the court to exonerate the bond. The surety shall deliver a copy of the motion to the
prosecutor.
(c) Unless the court makes a finding of good cause why the bond should not be
exonerated, it shall exonerate the bond if:
(i) the surety has delivered the defendant to the county jail booking facility in the
county where the original charge is pending;
(ii) the defendant has been released on a bond secured from a subsequent surety for
the original charge and the failure to appear;
(iii) after an arrest, the defendant has escaped from jail or has been released on the
defendant's own recognizance, pursuant to a pretrial release, under a court order
regulating jail capacity, or by a sheriffs release under section 17-22-5.5; or

(iv) the surety has transported or agreed to pay for the transportation of the defendant
from a location outside of the county back to the county where the original charge is
pending, and the payment is in an amount equal to government transportation expenses
listed in section 76-3-201.
(d) Under circumstances not otherwise provided for in this section, the court may
exonerate the bond if it finds that the prosecutor has been given reasonable notice of a
surety's motion and there is good cause for the bond to be exonerated.
(e) If a surety's bond has been exonerated under this section and the surety remains
liable for the cost of transportation of the defendant, the surety may take custody of the
defendant for the purpose of transporting the defendant to the jurisdiction where the
charge is pending.
77-20B-102. TIME FOR BRINGING DEFENDANT TO COURT.
(1) If notice of nonappearance has been mailed to a surety under Section 77-20b-10l,
the surety may bring the defendant before the court or surrender the defendant into the
custody of a county sheriff within the state within six months of the date of
nonappearance, during which time a forfeiture action on the bond may not be brought.
(2) A surety may request an extension of the six-month time period in Subsection (1),
if the surety within that time:
(a) files a motion for extension with the court; and
(b) mails the motion for extension and a notice of hearing on the motion to the
prosecutor.
(3) The court may extend the six-month time in Subsection (1) for not more than 60
days, if the surety has complied with Subsection (2) and the court finds good cause.
77-20B-103. DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY - NOTICE TO PROSECUTOR.
(1) If a surety is unable to bring a defendant to the court because the defendant is and
will be in the custody of authorities of another jurisdiction, the surety shall notify the
court and the prosecutor and provide the name, address, and telephone number of the
custodial authority.
(2) If the defendant is subject to extradition or other means by which the state can
return the defendant to the court's custody, and the surety gives notice under Subsection
(1), the surety's bond shall be exonerated:
(a) if the prosecutor elects in writing not to extradite the defendant immediately; and
(b) if the prosecutor elects in writing to extradite the defendant, to the extent the bond
exceeds the reasonable, actual, or estimated costs to extradite and return the defendant to
the court's custody, upon the occurrence of the earlier of:
(i) the prosecuting attorney's lodging a detainer on the defendant; or

(ii) 60 days after the surety gives notice to the prosecutor under Subsection (1), if the
defendant remains in custody of the same authority during that 60-day period.
77-20B-104. FORFEITURE OF BAIL.
(1) If a surety fails to bring the defendant before the court within the time provided in
Section 77-20b-102, the prosecuting attorney may request the forfeiture of the bail by:
(a) filing a motion for bail forfeiture with the court, supported by proof of notice to
the surety of the defendant's nonappearance; and
(b) mailing a copy of the motion to the surety.
(2) A court shall enter judgment of bail forfeiture without further notice if it finds by
a preponderance of the evidence:
(a) the defendant failed to appear as required;
(b) the surety was given notice of the defendant's nonappearance in accordance with
Section 77-20b-101;
(c) the surety failed to bring the defendant to the court within the six-month period
under Section 77-20b-102; and
(d) the prosecutor has complied with the notice requirements under Subsection (1).
(3) If the surety shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it has failed to bring
the defendant before the court because the defendant is deceased through no act of the
surety, the court may not enter judgment of bail forfeiture.
(4) The amount of bail forfeited is the face amount of the bail bond, but if the
defendant is in the custody of another jurisdiction and the state extradites or intends to
extradite the defendant, the court may reduce the amount forfeited to the actual or
estimated costs of returning the defendant to the court's jurisdiction. A judgment under
this Subsection (4) shall:
(a) identify the surety against whom judgment is granted;
(b) specify the amount of bail forfeited;
(c) grant the forfeiture of the tail; and
(d) be docketed by the clerk of the court in the civil judgment docket.
(5) A prosecutor may immediately commence collection proceedings to execute a
judgment of bond forfeiture against the assets of the surety.

ADDENDUM C

Third

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
DAVID S. WALSH, 3370
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3422
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
V.

DEFINO FERNANDEZ CADENA
(aka Luis Cesar Zargoza),
Defendant,

Case No. 011900113
Honorable William R. Barrett

And
SUN SURETY INSURANCE COMPANY
Surety.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the Surety's Motion to
Set Aside the Judgment entered on July 26, 2001. David S. Walsh represented
the State of Utah. David M. Cook represented the Sun Surety. The court having
considered the motion filed by the surety and after having heard argument by
counsel, the court finds that service on the agent is effective as service on the
surety itself.

Order
Case No. 011900113
Page Two

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the surety's Motion to Set side the
Judgment is hereby denied.
DATED this

/

day of October, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

WILLIAM R. BARRETT
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

1

day of October, 2001, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid to:
David M. Cook
Attorney for Sun Surety Insurance Company
211 East 300 South #216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

